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INTRODUCTION 
The overall performance level for an NDE operation is dependent 
on the NDE material. equipment, processes (methodology) and human 
skills applied to the operation. It is important to understand and 
consider human factors elements and contributions to NDE applications 
in the improvement of applications, in the design and validation of 
new applications, in automating portions of task performance, and 
in the development of modeling tools for the prediction of task 
performance for existing and new applications. 
Although human factors variables have been cited 'in various 
NDE capabilities studies. the human factors contribution has not often 
been separated and rigorously addressed as a separate issue (due, in 
part, to the difficulties in isolating the human contribution from 
other NDE operations variables) •. Some classical work relating human 
factors to functional performance may be cited as a basis for 
exploring human influences on NDE performance (1.2,3 and 4). This 
paper explores consideration of some classical methods for potential 
application to the characterization of human factors in NDE perform-
ance. 
THE MAKING OF AN NDE OPERATOR 
For purposes of this discussion. let us describe optimum or 
ideal NDE performance as that capability of a proven NDE process to 
detect an anomaly when carried out by an expert operator (a qualified, 
trained, skilled and experienced operator). An industrial worker is 
said to be skilled when he is qualified to carry out a trade or 
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craftwork involving knowledge, judgement and manual deftness, usually 
acquired as a result of long training, whereas an unskilled worker 
is not expected to do anything that cannot be learned in a relatively 
short period of time. The psychological use of the term is wider, 
and is concerned with factors which go to make up competent, expert, 
rapid and accurate performance (3). 
SKILLS TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT 
After the basic qualifications for entry into a skilled 
classification are met, the formal training process is initiated. 
Classroom instruction is used to impart specific knowledge of the 
principles, limitations and applications of the skill. The instruc-
tion is primarily procedural rather than educational in content. The 
content of the training is generally limited to a narrow area 
specifically related to the required application of the skill at the 
user facility. Classroom training is usually followed by an examina-
tion to ascertain the level of near-term understanding and recall of 
the specific facts and procedures of interest. Classroom training 
may be followed by laboratory training to develop necessary motor 
and sensory skills under closely supervised conditions. An examina-
tion covering the level and quality of performance may be admin-
istered. Skill development is completed by a period of "on the job 
training" during which performance is closely monitored and verified 
by a skilled supervisor or co-worker. After a further period of 
experience and practice, the knowledge and skill information are 
"compiled" in the brain of the individual operator and a level of 
expertise is established. Such expertise becomes part of the "long 
term memory" of the operator and operations involving application 
of the "compiled" expertise can be carried out with less conscious 
attention to the coordinated elements of the task. 
HUMAN ERRORS IN NDE OPERATIONS 
Errors in performance by skilled operators may be classified as: 
SYSTEMATIC ERROR (consistent offset from ideal performance); ERRORS IN 
PRECISION (consistent, but random, variations in performance about a 
norm); SPORADIC ERRORS (an occasional occurrence varying significantly 
from the norm). A systematic error is experienced as a constant off-
set, for example, a wind condition when target shooting. An error in 
precision is experienced as the scatter pattern when target shooting. 
A sporadic error is typified by landing a jet aircraft in a lake, 
1000 feet short of the runway (5). 
An NDE task is an exercise in conditional probability with two 
error modes: TYPE I, failure to find a flaw when a flaw is present 
(False Negative) and TYPE II, finding a flaw when no flaw is present 
(False Positive). The result of all types of classified errors 
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are manifested as Type I or Type II errors in the overall results 
from an inspection task. 
INFLUENCE OF HUMAN FACTORS ON THE PROBABILITY OF DETECTION 
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A recognized method characterizing the performance capability 
of an NDE method is by quantification and plotting outcome as a 
probability of detection (POD) curve as shown in Figure 1. An ideal 
NDE process yields a POD curve with a constant, high level of detec-
tion at large flaw sizes and a sharp drop off in discrimination at 
small flaw sizes. Sporadic errors in detection at large flaw sizes 
will result in data scatter at large flaw sizes and is usually due 
to sporadic human error (Figure 2). Such errors are often associated 
with drowsiness, lack of interest, lack of motivation, fatigue, 
boredom, monotony or state of arousal (vigilance). Such errors may 
be minimized by attention to the factors responsible for the error 
occurrence and by redundant inspections (6). 
Errors in precision are indicated by data scatter at the 
transition region of the POD curve and can be caused by slight 
variations in processing, by inexperience of the operator or by a 
shift in decision criteria (usually due to a lack of confidence) 
during the processing operation. Experience, expert skill develop-
ment and well defined and recognized decision criteria will minimize 
this mode of human error. (See Figure 3.) 
Systematic errors are indicated by a shift in the threshold 
transition point on the POD curve when inspection is carried out on 
identical components by two different operators or by a single 
operator operating with two different sets of decision criteria. 
(See Figure 4.) Differences in performance may be due to a difference 
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Figure 1. Idealized POD Curve. 
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Figure 2. Variable Detection 
(Sporadic Errors). 
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Figure 3. Impact of Errors of 
Precision on POD. 
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Figure· 4. Two POD Curves--Different Decision Criteria. 
in skill and/or decision criteria input by the operators; or may be 
due to differences in processing materials, processing equipment, 
calibration standards or procedures for the two inspections. Proper 
training and direction regarding decision criteria have been shown 
to reduce systematic errors between inspections and between operators 
(7,8, and 9). 
When two such data sets are combined, the resultant POD curve is 
as shown in Figure 5. Figure 5 has no sharp threshold transition 
point and is difficult to interpret due to the multiple variations 
that affect the POD as a function of flaw size. Such curves are fre-
quently associated with round robin test programs (10 and 11). 
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Figure 5. POD for Combined 
Results--Different 
Decision Criteria. 
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Figure 6. POD for High Detect-
ability (Point A). 
SIGNAL DETECTION AND CHARACTERIZATION 
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Quantification of signals from known standards is suggested as 
a method of approaching the problems of variation in performance 
between facilities due to calibration differences, equipment 
differences, etc., as well as that of predicting a level of ideal 
performance. 
If we refer to the POD curve as shown in Figure 6, it is obvious 
that large flaws are readily detected by the NDE techniques with a 
"high signal threshold". The point of interest is that near the 
threshold detection point where it is necessary to detect faint, 
infrequent signals from background noise. Such a problem is similar 
to that addressed in characterizing operator performance with radar 
equipment. The requirement to detect faint, infrequent signals was 
addressed by studies of human variations in signal detection (ie. 
continued performance as a function of time) and variations in the 
decision process (ie. variations in performance as a function of 
signal to noise ratio. 
SIGNAL DETECTION AND DECISION THEORY 
The work of primary interest in NDE engineering and in automa-
tion of NDE processes is that of signal detection and analyses. 
Early application of statistical decision theory to signal detection 
was made by Tanner and his associates (3, 7) in which they proposed 
that signals have to be detected against a certain amount of back-
ground noise and that the signal required to secure any degree of 
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accuracy will increase with the noise level. The discrimination of 
a process can be specified in terms of signal-to-noise ratio. 
If we consider a single operating point near the threshold 
discrimination level of a probability of detection (POD) curve, as 
noted in Figure 6. noise can be successfully discriminated from 
signal plus noise and inspection success can be predicted. If such 
an inspection is repeated successively, a probability density func-
tion versus signal amplitude may be generated as shown in Figure 7. 
It is clear that the noise distribution is separated from the signal 
plus noise distribution and positive discrimination between the two 
can be made by choosing a decision criterion level shown as level A. 
The actual success of the discrimination is dependent on the detection 
criteria applied to the observed signals. If the decision criteria 
(signal required to call a positive detection) is set too high (moved 
to the right as in level B), successful discrimination will result 
most of the time, but some flaws will be accepted with resultant 
Type I errors. If the decision point is set too low (moved to the 
left as in level C), successful detection will result all of the time, 
but some noise signals will be incorrectly identified as flaws and 
good parts will be rejected (Type II errors). For a given non-
destructive evaluation method, operating point and flaw size, the 
probability of detection (true positive) and the probability of a 
false alarm (false positive) may be plotted as shown in Figure 8. 
The diagonal line is that data form for random chance with no 
discrimination. The upper left coordinates describe the performance 
of a perfect inspection with total discrimination. This method of 
plotting was originated and termed the "Relative Operating Character-
istic or ROC" curve by Tanner and Swets (4). Points along the ROC 
curve constitute a characteristic inspection state at varying 
decision criterion values. For a given operating point, quantitative 
values for detection success and false call rates can be obtained. 
It is clear, from such analysis, that the human operator can be very 
reliable, if the signal and noise acceptance criteria are established 
at the proper level and if a high degree of discrimination is 
attained by the specific NDE method. Conversely, the boundary 
conditions of the method and decision criteria, provide primary 
physical limits to the capability of a given inspection. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The human operator is usually reliable in performing a wide 
variety of tasks but must operate within the boundary conditions of 
his capabilities and within the boundary conditions set by the 
physical limits of the task to be performed. NDE tasks are complex 
and require knowledge, skill, experience and dexterity for optimum 
performance. When detection and discrimination are not attained by 
an NDE process, the most frequent cause stated is that of operator 
errors, which can and do occur. Proper attention must be given 
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Figure 7. High Discrimination Figure 8. ROC Curve-Single Point 
Level-Point A. on POD Curve. 
to those NDE processes involving human operators to assure that the 
tools, working conditions and environment are commensurate with the 
task being performed. 
The most frequent cause for unreliable NDE performance that has 
been observed by the author is that of improper NDE engineering. In 
many cases, the NDE method selected is incorrect or was not qualified 
and controlled to the level necessary to obtain the required 
discrimination. In other cases, the NDE equipment, materials and 
processes are not controlled and do not provide discrimination to 
the level qualified. In short, human factors in NDE involves NDE 
engineers, materials and process control engineers, calibration and 
maintenance personnel, training personnel, supervision--and the 
performing operator. We have no right to expect reliable detection 
and discrimination by the human operator (or by an automated unit), 
when an NDE process has been altered up-stream of a detection 
opportunity. NDE reliability involves the entire NDE team and that 
team may be much larger than you think. The science and technology 
being developed and reported in this symposium must be incorporated 
as tools by the NDE team in the form of improved requirements 
specifications and in improved understanding of the capabilities and 
limitations of NDE for reliable detection and discrimination. 
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DISCUSSION 
From the Floor: I've been involved in NDE certification and this is 
relevant to problems that we are having in NDE certification. 
My experience of almost 30 years of NOE is that we have got 
very few poor NOE operators in the industry. We have had a lot 
of problems involving NDE operators. The big problem has been 
in management control, lack of appropriate training provided 
to operators, and a lack of materials capability, not the NOE 
portions. It's harder to relate the NOE capability to materials 
properties. In other words, to anticipate what the defect is 
and what all defects would be in that particular problem that 
we're working with. We should be able to, from our mind's eye, 
anticipate what will happen from a problem presenting itself 
and then being able to read from the data what that problem 
actually is. In other words, we anticipate. 
It is easy if all the parameters are known and one knows 
exactly where to look. But if you don't know where to look, 
sometimes the flaws don't show up. So what happens is we have 
NDE operators being blamed because they are not qualified and 
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lack certification. Managers expect to get all their NDE 
problems taken care of by certification. but it is also necessary 
to do a better job of planning the NDE training for them in the 
materials they want to inspect and in the nature of the test 
they are going to be asked to implement. If these changes were 
adopted. we will have a lot less trouble. 
W.D. Rummel: I would like to add to that. We do a pretty good job 
in the front-end classroom training but in the on-the-job 
training and in the feed-back. sometimes it is a little unclear 
what's required to actually do the job. 
In one particular case in which we were doing a reliability 
study at the facility. the operators were absolutely delighted 
to participate in this exercise because this is the first time 
that they had been able to operate on parts with no flaws. They 
viewed it as feedback and part of their training. 
I.G. Scott (Department of Defence. Australia): Would you care to 
comment further on rewards and penalties? That's something 
that's pretty difficult to build into at NDE. 
W.D. Rummel: It is very difficult to build into the human operations 
also because the reward and penalty cannot be isolated to that 
one quadrant where we are talking about people. We must make 
sure that all factors are in. If we make a conscious effort 
to make sure all factors are doing that. then rather than 
rewards and penalty. we remove those operators who indeed can't 
perform and we will probably have to pay those operators who 
are performing more and that's one of the suggestions that's been 
made. In order to avoid turnover in an area. you have to pay 
those operators more and maintain their skill. 
I.G. Scott: Can I qualify that question a little? You have answered 
it perfectly. In abbreviating the question. I perhaps didn't 
put it as clearly as possible. The penalty for a mistake on 
Columbia is far greater than the penalty for a mistake on your 
own car. Would you care to comment on that? 
W.D. Rummel: That's the risk analysis part of it. Risk analysis 
is viewed differently in different aspects. Unfortunately. we 
too often identify with the liability that goes with the 
consumer product as opposed to the more spectacular kind of a 
problem that we might have if Columbia falls through or is not 
done properly. When it's taken out of the hands of those who 
are knowledgeable about the performance of the hardware and 
relegated to the lawyers. then we have an entirely different 
problem. So I think that's the difference. I think we are 
talking apples and oranges in the two risks. 
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B.W. Staff (Lockheed-Georgia Co.): There's been a number of studies 
and a fair amount of work in the last few years on probabilistic 
studies for NDE as well as getting into fracture mechanics. but 
the only suggested way of handling the false call is associated 
with the real cost associated with the real application with 
that false call, should it result in a major catastrophe. Is 
there any other way that you know of that this can be handled? 
W.O. Rummel: I think the proper place for the false calls is in the 
establishment of the technique on the front end or defining 
what that relative operating characteristic curve is or the 
decision point and designing both the training and the actual 
application around that. Then you must make a conscious 
decision to accept the false call rate that goes with that 
reliability. 
B.W. Staff: But that involves the lawyer and the manager up front. 
W.O. Rummel: In the case of a false call. if you make that decision 
up front without the lawyer and manager, what it means is that 
you may do a redundant inspection or you may do a complementary 
inspection to alleviate any problems that may result from that 
false call. 
D.E.W. Stone (Royal Aircraft Establishment): How much do you think 
that management can do to alleviate the aspects of boredom? 
Perhaps by introducing the occasional deliberate fault? In 
many situations where they have been looking for a defect for 
several years and never found one. I think they'll never find 
one with that particular technique. Can't management improve on 
this? 
W.O. Rummel: Well. management can improve on the front end by making 
sure we have the proper technique that's capable of discovering. 
As I mentioned, we can have redundancy and then we can work the 
other part of the human factors problem to make sure that the 
job assignment is such that we minimize the boredom. we have 
some proper rewards and penalties, so to speak. or rewards, 
attention given when a flag is actually raised. 
J.C. Coffey (Central Electricity Generating Board. England): You 
wouldn't go so far as to slip in a deliberate defect? 
W.O. Rummel: Any time we try to game the operator (there has been 
some of that done), we find that we aren't as smart as the 
operators are on the floor. 
